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## GENERAL SOCIOLOGY<sup>1</sup>

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Like all sciences which embrace fundamental principles and concrete elaborations of the same, sociology falls naturally into two parts. *General sociology* is study of the conditions (physical and psychical), elements, forms, forces, processes, results (at given stages), and implications of human association. *Special sociology* ("applied sociology," "social technology," "Sozialpolitik") is procedure on the basis of a presupposed general sociology, particularly upon the presumption of certain ascertained social values and corresponding purposes, to work out feasible programs for social co-operation which will assure progress toward attainment of the purposes.

It will be convenient to amplify these descriptions by means, first, of a brief historical survey, and second, of further analysis.

One of the least contested conventionalities of sociology is that Auguste Comte was its founder (*Philosophie Positive*, 6 vols., 1830-42). It does not detract from Comte's merit, while it partially explains the sparse growth of sociology for a half-century after his first planting, to point out that a tedious work of clearing the ground was necessary before the kind of seed sown by Comte could be fruitful. It is instructive to recall certain almost forgotten steps in the experience of bringing soil fit for the growth of modern social science under cultivation.

The apogee of the speculative method of interpreting social phenomena was marked by Hegel's lectures on the "Philosophy of History" (1823-27). The finial of Hegel's social philosophy is the "synthesis," "The state is reason at its highest power." An unfinished century of practical politics has meanwhile proved,

<sup>1</sup> This paper and the one that follows by Dr. Henderson, were written for the *Cyclopaedia of American Government*, announced to appear in the near future. The papers together present a conspectus which should not be without value even to professional sociologists. Messrs. D. Appleton & Co. have courteously granted permission for the present publication.

not by dialectics, but by its diplomacies, its international law, its Hague tribunal, its arbitration treaties, its voluntary associations, that the state is not reason at its highest power. Some of Hegel's own contemporaries began to be skeptical of the Hegelian formulation of the congenital German presumption. Evidence was already visible that both power and reason existed in the world above and beyond the state. Accordingly, men began to reconsider the question, What is the state? Almost a generation after Hegel had pressed his method to its self-contradiction in drawing the deadline of human development at the boundaries of the state, challenge of this arbitrariness first took its modern form. Whether with or without the Hegelian logic, the question, What is the state? would inevitably have elicited answers, sooner or later, in terms of what the state is not. In fact, at the middle of the century, a number of men in unison, but with little if any knowledge of one another except in one or two instances, uttered virtually the same answer: "*The state is not society. What then is society?*" This question in effect opened up from a new direction the whole field of inquiry since occupied by the sociologists. There could be no development of the researches which Comte demanded till the minds of many men were fertilized by desire for objective knowledge of the social reality.

At the same time it would be provincial and preposterous for the sociologists to claim that they alone have made the discoveries with which sociology is immediately concerned. All human experience, and all social sciences as interpretations of that experience have co-operated in reaching perceptions which it is now the sociologists' division of labor to formulate, to systematize, and to evaluate as means of more penetrating interpretation of experience. In other words, the relation between general sociology and the social sciences as a whole bears close resemblances to the relation between historical methodology, as represented by Bernheim for instance, and the technique of particular historical investigations.

Although the term "society" (for reasons which will be evident presently we are particularly concerned with the German equivalent *Gesellschaft*) is not a modern invention, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that serious attempts were made

to fashion that term into a tool of scientific precision. The names of Ahrens (*Cours du droit naturel*, 1839; *Organische Staatslehre*, 1850; *Rechtsphilosophie*, 4th ed., 1852), von Mohl (*Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften*, 3 vols., 1855), and Lorenz von Stein (*Der Socialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreichs*, 2d ed., 1848) may be selected to represent the mid-century effort to this end. Under the general title "Civic Sciences and Societary Sciences" von Mohl sketched the fortunes of the concept "society" previous to his time, and attempted to show the need of a system of societary sciences (*op. cit.*, I, 67 f.). When the insurgency which was latent in the societary conception had reached expression in the group referred to, the principal variant from the prevalent orthodoxy was distinct affirmation of a *somewhat*, over and above the state, corresponding to the term "society." The problem then was to analyze the concepts "state" and "society" so as to determine their relation to each other. The success of this mid-century out-reaching for a definition of "society" which would be a means of more precisely determining the state was dubious. One of the reasons is to be found in an association carried over from immemorial tradition of the state, and transferred in kind as a preconception of "society." In brief, as the state was thought of in a mystical fashion as a power independent of persons, superior to persons, and transcendent over persons, so the initial attempts to comprehend "society" did not untrammel themselves from a parallel mysticism. Certain obvious facts were observed and noted about spheres of human interests which were not coterminous with the realm of the state. Thus, von Mohl said (*op. cit.*, p. 70):

Only recently have we come to the clear conception that the community life of men is by no means exhausted by life in the state, but that between the sphere of the individual personality and of the organized unity of popular life there is a collection of intermediate life phenomena which also have community objects as their purpose, which do not have their origin from the state or through it, although they are in existence in it, and that these are of the highest significance for weal and woe. These two areas of thoughts and theories, which for more than two thousand years have seemed to be similar, or at most have been regarded as part and whole, have at length proved themselves to be essentially different, and must also be treated separately, so that in the future they will exist side by side as distinguished but not coequal divisions of human knowledge.

If we may venture to force these vaguenesses into the more literal terms of today, we find that at this stage of interpretation a certain type of spatial conception was the peculiar factor of unreality. "Sphere," "area," "intermediate life phenomena," and the like are phrases which, as the context conclusively shows, connoted location as one of the chief stigmata of "society" in the same sense in which it was attributed to the state. "Society," like the state, was somewhere, the two somewheres not coinciding in position; and the problem was primarily to mark their stations.<sup>1</sup>

It must be admitted that these propositions do not account for everything contained in theorizing about "state" and "society" of which they are affirmed. On the contrary, the main difficulty in discovering the clue to differences between earlier and later conceptions of "state" and "society" is that in so large a part of their concrete contents they look identical. It is only when we probe down to these antecedent notions that we find radical variation. Thus, von Mohl posits three cardinal human "conditions" (*Zustände*), which appear to figure in his mind as intersecting planes of human life (and yet, by definition, not human life at all), or perhaps more nearly as interpenetrating nebulae of different composition (*op. cit.*, pp. 88 f.). In the first place, there is the "area of the *individual personality*," or "the great number of the particular personalities existing side by side in time and space, and their relationships to like personalities." In the second place, there is the area of *the state*, or "an organism of arrangements which in each case unites a number of persons living together in a limited space into a unity with a total will, a total energy and pursuing common purposes." In the third place, there is "*society*," i.e., a totality of associations" which can be located neither in the life-circle of the separate individuals nor in that of the state" (*ibid.*, p. 98). Referring to this third category von Mohl further specifies:

These conditions are differentiated from the life of the individuals essentially in this respect, that in the former the central point always is the egotistic

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Louis Wallis has suggested as a parallel to the above-described presumptions about the spatial location of "state" and "society" the condition of Job's thoughts about Jehovah: *Oh that I knew where I might find him!* . . . Behold, I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him: on the left hand where he doth work, but I cannot behold him; he hideth himself on the right hand that I cannot see him" (Job 23:3, 8, 9).

purpose (*Selbstzweck*) of a single person, and everything may be considered merely in connection with the same. In the latter, on the contrary, a considerable collection of persons is at the same time under corresponding influences of a common cause, and thus moved to community action. The essence of the individual life is selfish reference to itself. The essence of these spontaneous associations is extension and community.

In a note von Mohl exposes the futility of his analysis more effectively than it could be done by a critic. He refers to the possible question: May there not, besides these three relationships of men to men, be others, and if that is the case, is it not necessary in order to discover the full truth, to investigate all of these at the same time? He replies:

Undoubtedly there are, along with these three, other relationships of men to men, and among these many that are important: for instance, the family, the tribe, the associations of states; yet for the present purpose it is enough to investigate the three, *because the others do not contribute to the understanding of the nature of society and of the state in themselves, and of their relationships to one another. It follows that taking them into account would merely confuse our survey and insight.* (!)

Although political philosophy had arrived at a strong sense of the necessity of a social philosophy, its exclusions as thus indicated show that it was still a long way from a clue to an objective method of social interpretation. Nevertheless, von Mohl proceeds to develop an intricate scheme of "societary sciences," to be worked out in close parallelism with the civic sciences as at that time defined. This whole mid-century movement, under the influence of a partially completed discovery that in addition to the state there are outlying human relationships not yet interpreted, marked an important advance toward positive social philosophy. It emphasized a need, although it did not accomplish much toward satisfying the demand.

The immediate effects of these groping social interpretations upon the methodology of the social sciences are not easy to trace. For nearly a generation after the Ahrens-von Mohl group there was little to indicate vitality in the suggestion of "societary science." In 1874, for example, Roscher declared that he was not impressed with the methodological importance of von Mohl's proposals (*National Oekonomik in Deutschland*, p. 944). His reason was as fictitious as his foresight was fallible. He says:

A civic science without regard to these societary areas would be quite superficial. All the great statesmen have known that, since Plato and Aristotle. On the other hand, a theory of these societary areas without regard to the state [*sic*] would be quite incomplete and impractical.

He adds:

Yet the whole proposal may be regarded as in several respects an important sign of the times. Thus a reaction against the empty formalism into which the greater part of our theories of natural rights and of constitutionalism had degenerated; a protest against the excessive state-omnipotence to which the democracy of our times is inclined; a cry of warning to rouse the ruling and propertied classes from their complaisant contentment toward the fourth estate; a warning against that so customary ignoring, or even despising of the smaller groups in the folk, although they alone are capable of supporting a genuinely vital and free folk-life; perhaps also a symptom of the degree in which, notably in Germany, folk-life and civic life had grown apart!

Roscher undoubtedly voiced the impression of the majority of his generation that, so far as serious science was concerned, the societary suggestion was a closed incident. But a new generation was already on the stage, and even the older generation had not yet uttered its last word on the subject of "society." The *Verein für Sozialpolitik* was born before Roscher's book appeared. That organization proved to be, in spirit and in practice, if not as profoundly as might be in confession, a vindication of the social idea (*vid.* below, p. 213). Almost at the same moment with the publication of Roscher's book, Schäffle was writing the preface of *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers* (1875), and Spencer was delivering the first instalment of *Principles of Sociology* (1874-77). "Society" had been rediscovered by a publicist whom Roscher himself had called "certainly one of the foremost economists of our time" (*op. cit.*, p. 1042), and by a cosmic philosopher who was doing more than any contemporary to advise the world of the significance of Charles Darwin's generalizations. Both of these writers were ridiculed and abused, but the opposition attacked non-essentials and was blind to that part of their work which marked an achievement in objective apprehension of human reality. Both overworked biological analogies as vehicles for exposition of the interconnections between human facts; but all their crudities of method were outweighed by their service in visualizing literal relations between different human activities. Schäffle and Spencer had outgrown

the obsessions which credited "state" and "society" with "spheres" set off in mystical ways from persons. They had advanced to the perception that human experience, from earliest to latest, is a function of innumerable group relationships. Their problem then was to make out the different orders of groups which are visible in human experience, and to define the typical forms of reciprocal influence which these groups exhibit. We may characterize the Schäffle-Spencer stage of societary interpretation as assured of the continuity of human relationships, of interconnections of personal actions and reactions, from the minutest or most casual human group out to the most comprehensive and permanent, as having made a creditable beginning of analyzing the social groups and their interactions, from family to humanity, and (perhaps most significant of all) as having in principle suspended all favoritism toward particular types of groups. The clue which their analyses followed was that society is a plexus of personal reactions mediated through institutions or groups. One among these reaction-exchanges was the state; but the state was no longer presumed to be in the last analysis of a radically different origin, office or essence from any other group in the system. It simply had to pass muster with the other groups, on the merits or the demerits of its performance.

It would be imprudent to allege that the sociologists since the Schäffle-Spencer period have discovered anything which was not implicitly in the two works named. Purposely waiving that issue, we need assert only that subsequent observations of human phenomena have resulted in reconstructions which contrast sharply, in form, in details of content, and in effect upon mental and moral attitude, with the sociological interpretations of that earlier date. This proposition is true in different particulars, in the variations of sociological theory peculiar to different countries. The limits of this article permit illustration of the divergence in a single case only.

Until quite recently, sociology has languished in England, while it has flourished in the United States. One of the decisive reasons for the English side of this contrast was a diversion created by an antecedent question which arrested the development of purely sociological theory. It seems paradoxical that the chief popularizer



of the evolutionary idea should have proved a hindrance to the growth of constructive sociology. In England, at least, that was the case in a high degree in this way: evolutionism, and particularly Spencer's version of evolution, was understood to make for the conclusion, that modification of the workings of physical laws by human volition is impossible. It is an open question whether Spencer was more sinned against or sinning in the creation of this impression. At all events, sociology for a time almost disappeared in England, while the mental attitude which obstructed sociological progress found its support in a conception of evolution supposed to have been sponsored by Spencer. If the last word of science was that evolutionary human improvement is a delusion, that men must wait for physical laws automatically to work out all the human salvation that is possible, no sufficient motive was left for attempting to lay a scientific foundation for ameliorative effort. Anything in excess of mere historical review of past evolution would be futile. It came about, therefore, that sociological initiative in England during the past thirty years has tended predominantly either into superficial empirics, or into the field of "eugenics." This latter development is quite in character, because in the phenomena of breeding, if anywhere, facts may be ascertained and inferences drawn with a minimum of shock to the preconception that the conditions concerned are exclusively physical. The most convincing picture of this situation, because it is unintended, may be found in the little book *Social Evolution and Political Theory* (1911), by Hobhouse, one of the few men in England whose sociology has not remained insular.

The case in the United States is very different. In 1883, Lester F. Ward, a botanist, qualified as Spencer never was by first-hand study of organic phenomena to speak as an evolutionist, published in two volumes the work *Dynamic Sociology*. It performed the service of convincing a generation of budding American sociologists that the suspected conflict between evolution and human effort was a false issue. The fictitious dilemma between evolution and enterprise has consequently never visibly embarrassed sociological thinking in this country. In Ward's preface was this declaration of independence:

Just as Comte could complain that the philosophy of Hobbes, Locke, and Voltaire was negative, so it may now be maintained that the school of Mill, Spencer, and Fiske is also negative. From the purely statical stage of the former the latter has only advanced to the passively dynamic stage, which recognizes only the changes wrought by Nature unassisted by Art; but before the science of society can be truly founded another advance must be made and the actively dynamic stage reached, in which social phenomena shall be contemplated as capable of intelligent control by society itself in its own interest.

Contempt for sociology has often been expressed in Europe in the phrase, "the American science." The slur is an ungraciously masked tribute. While work of the first rank in the field of general sociology has been done in Europe during the past quarter-century, the most effective work has been done in the United States. This has been due less to the exceptional originality of detached individual achievements than to actual, though not formal, division of labor carried on with progressive consciousness of common purpose. An increasing number of scholars prompted by fundamentally identical interests have devoted themselves to different phases of pending problems within the range indicated by our description of general sociology. They have subjected one another's work to searching and stimulating criticism. There have been few instances in the history of science in which the circumstances were more favorable to positive results. No vested orthodoxy existed which could prejudice conclusions. By tacit consent, the work to be done was undertaken as search into relationships which had never been fairly explored. The very fact that many men entered upon this search from almost as many different approaches insured multiple checks upon the returns. The outcome up to date would doubtless be variously appraised by different participants in this virtual co-operation, and it would be impossible to obtain a consensus about the relative importance of different pieces of work which have been positive or negative factors in reaching the present status of the inquiry. Without attempting to pass upon details of this sort, we venture to describe that which is today common to American workers in the field of general sociology as follows:

We have arrived at ability to state fundamental problems of sociology in substantially this form, viz.: *Under what categories*

*is it necessary to think human experience, if it is to be presented objectively, and what are the typical relationships between activities assembled under the several categories?* Without comment on the magnitude of this achievement in itself, as a means of controlling and co-ordinating investigation, it must be added that the first formal answer which we now give to the question is also of inestimable methodological importance, viz.: We now say that human experience is chiefly an affair of *associatings* between persons, in their copings with the physical and psychical conditions to which they are subject. That is, presupposing the physical factors, and also the consciousness factors into which personality may be resolved (both of which groups of factors are in the first instance problems not of general sociology at all but of other disciplines), "experience," which presents the problems of sociology, is the phenomena of the lives of persons in the course of developing and using their endowment as sentient beings. Experience then is never strictly solipsistic. It is always social. Accordingly, to speak after the manner of the Schoolmen, the categories "experience" and "association" are to each other as substance and attribute. That is, they are interchangeable for certain alternative purposes. The fundamental problem of sociology thereupon falls into the specific problems of discovering the categories under which the different orders of associatings observed in experience must be subsumed.

There is little difference of opinion among American sociologists today over the further proposition that sociological categories will be adequate in the degree in which they connote prevalence of movement over status. That is, experience reveals to us more meaning under the aspect of activity than of fixity. This is of course merely a detail implied in the evolutionary conception. Accordingly, the category *social process* has become a cardinal means of sociological interpretation (Ratzenhofer, *Sociologische Erkenntnis*, 1898, chap. iv. Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, Index title, "Process, social"). "The process conception of life," or "the social process," is a phrase that has only recently come into standard usage among social scientists, and it marks a development of social self-consciousness which cost the labors of many

thinkers during a half-century. Analysis of experience is carried on by sociologists today with reference less to what is existing than to what is doing and becoming in a given passage of experience. Described with respect to form rather than content, the social process is a tide of separating and blending social processes, consisting of incessant decomposition and recomposition of relations within persons and between persons in a continuous evolution of types of persons and associations. (Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 91-99, 150.)

All this apparently sterile labor, therefore, of determining the categories in accordance with which experience unfolds, is in fact the most basic work thus far performed for sophistication of the social sciences. It marks the latest gains of social self-consciousness in out-growing the condition of "seeing men as trees walking." In other words, the social reality is a "going affair." The entities which men used to think they found when they inspected life turn out to be cross-sections of a continuity of personal becomings. The myth "individual" has given place to the *socius* (Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 24; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 10, 34, 161, ff.). Each grouping of *socii*, from the simplest sexual mating up to the collidings of civilizations, tells its full story, not in terms of what it is, at a given time. That is merely a moment in the process. The completer report combines what the relationship was, but is no longer, what it is tending to be, and what our present insight indicates that it should be. Incidentally, therefore, "the state" in the traditional sense, the sense which vitiated most of Spencer's political reasonings, the sense which still frequently confuses the minds of legislators and jurists and executives, falls into the rank of a discredited hypothesis. The concept "state" of the older political philosophies was used as a term in a type of reasoning which authorized transfer of general propositions illustrated by the Pharaohs' "state," the Sultan's "state," or the Czar's "state" to the "state" of Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, or Americans. This is as far from objectivity as it would be if the concept "matter" were held to justify specific affirmations about radium or sodium or oxygen, merely because the same had been illustrated in the behavior of ice or iron

or hydrogen. In the last analysis, the "state" is merely a convenient term of inclusion for all the compulsory ways in which the persons of a more or less accidentally determined territory are co-operating at a given time in adjustment both of their common and their particular interests. This co-operating may not be stated as though it were yesterday, today, and forever the same. It is always a function of the associatings of past, present, and future persons. It is therefore, like the rest of human experience, a congeries of relationships in the course of evolution.

The like is true of the category "society." It is still a term of convenience, but with less prospect than ever of becoming a tool of precision. What we actually find where the term "society" was once supposed to fix bounds, is merely an indefinite range of partially or wholly articulated associatings, among which are those co-operatings provisionally denoted by the term "state." Several years ago an American sociologist crystallized this perception into the aphorism, "Society is virtually a verbal noun" (Hayes, *American Journal of Sociology*, XI, 36). We may generalize the proposition. If we should invent a vocabulary along the lines cautiously followed in this article, that is, a terminology to correspond with all we can now see in the light of the process concept, we should probably seem even to some of our own number to be compounding pedantry. As we now interpret experience, however, each noun which stands primarily for a social situation or condition would have to appear in a verbal form if it suggested our whole thought. Thus, when we say "individuals," or "groups," or "associations," or "functions," or "institutions," and so on, we really mean "individualizings," or "groupings," or "associatings," or "functionings," or "institutionalizing," etc. That is, experience makes itself known to us in the form of incessant repersonalizing of persons and rearrangings of arrangements; and this element of becoming is the most decisive factor in our understanding of any portion of experience.

It should go without saying that at least embryonic sense of proportion is assumed as a precondition of using sociological categories. The ratio in which the aspects of status and of movement are to be reckoned as meaning factors in a given case must

always be a matter of judgment. A desperate criminal at large, a starving family, an epidemic, is first and foremost a very present fact, to be dealt with as such. On the other hand, the factors which predetermine crime, poverty, disease, or the elements which should find their reckoning in a national tariff, conservation, or arbitration policy reach far back and far forward, and they consequently call for consideration and action very different from that appropriate to a specific case.

Thus far we have spoken almost exclusively of the formal side of experience. In the mere matter of terms, sociologists are nearer uniformity in their symbols for the modes of experience than in categories for the content of experience. In spirit, however, they have steadily been approaching unanimity in the conviction that the social process must be understood as of, by, and for persons, and that appraisals of given stages of the process must turn upon their visible output in personalizings and associatings of enlarged scope and improved quality.

"The supreme result of efficient social organization and the supreme test of efficiency is the development of the *socius*, or the personality of the social man. If the man himself becomes less social, less rational, less manly; if he falls from the highest type, which seeks self-realization, to one of those lower types that manifest only the primitive virtues of power; if he becomes non-social or anti-social—the social organization, whatever its apparent merits, is failing to achieve its supreme object. If, on the contrary, the man is becoming ever better as a human being, more rational, more sympathetic, with an ever-broadening consciousness of kind—then, whatever its apparent defects, the social organization is sound and efficient" (Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, p. 320). "Men's experience is the evolution of human values" (Small, *The Meaning of Social Science*, p. 137). Considered on the side of content, some shaping of the concept *human realization*, as a consummation not to be defined *a priori* but to be built up by accumulatings and expandings and adjustings of concepts of personal qualities, both within persons and between persons, is becoming the normative category of experience.

It is not practicable within the limits of this article to speak

of the more particular sociological categories. They seem to be more heterogeneous than they are, because they have been worked out from the standpoint of different planes of relationship within the social process. Some of the best-known groups of categories may be found in the following works: from the standpoint of social *genesis*: Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*; *Inductive Sociology*; Sumner, *Folkways*; Thomas, *Source Book of Social Origins*; Howard, *History of Matrimonial Institutions*; social *forms*: Simmel, *Soziologie*; social *forces*: Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, *Pure Sociology*, *Applied Sociology*; social *psychology*: Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, and *Social Organization*, the two last named books at the same time the fullest exposition of the category "social organization"; social *control*: Ross, *Social Control*.

In thus describing the distinctive work of general sociology, we have indirectly expanded our description of special sociology.<sup>1</sup> There either is, or there is developing, a peculiar technique and technology for each division and subdivision of deliberate effort for social improvement. The respective technologies are systematic programs for promoting the health, wealth, and culture interests of the groups with which each is primarily concerned: the family, the industrial group, the urban group, the rural group, the criminal group, etc. In so far as these technologies are scientifically founded, they presuppose the categories to which we have referred, and they make use of these categories not only in analyzing the group situations and tendencies, but also in determining the rational group purposes. This was memorably illustrated in the platform adopted at its organization by the Verein für Sozialpolitik, perhaps the most influential voluntary organization in the world for promoting social technology. That creed was a particular rendering of the human realization category. It may be summarized in the proposition reiterated by Schmoller in many variations: "*Every member of the community should be put in a way to share in all the developing goods of civilization.*"

The most instructive résumé that has been written of the influence of the social idea is the contribution of Professor von

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dr. Henderson's paper following this.

Philippovich, entitled "The Infusion of Socio-political Ideas into the Literature of German Economics," in the second of the two volumes dedicated on his seventieth birthday to Professor Schmoller. The estimate is especially valuable because it is the judgment not of a sociologist but of an economist. The closing sentences of the monograph are these:

How the relationships of men take place . . . is no longer dependent upon economic appraisal, it is rather a consequence of the moral ordering of life. To have shown this, and to have made it a basis of the actions of men in society and in the state, is the merit of that change which has been brought about through the infusion of the socio-political ideas into national economy. New tasks are therewith assigned to the science which the older science did not recognize. From a mere theory of industry it becomes a social theory. Its task is no longer merely to describe the simple correlation between goods and active self-interest. Its business is now to recognize this interdependence as also both cause and effect of other occurrences; and consequently its duty is to understand the course of industry under the influence of nature and of moralization in order that we may learn to control it.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For the whole paragraph, *vid.* above, p. 199.